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Introduction 
Brazil has recently developed an extensive intelligence system composed of at least thirteen 
different organizations. The most important factors determining the main characteristics of this 
system were on the one hand the noxious stigma associated with intelligence organizations 
during the military dictatorship of 1964-85, and on the other hand the benign view of the outside 
world held by Brazilian decisionmakers and the general public. The development of the system 
was slow and drawn out due to these two factors and exacerbated by political weakness and 
fecklessness in the executive branch between 1985 and 1995, and the slow emergence of 
interest by members of the legislative branch in the issue of intelligence. The system is the 
creation of the executive and the legislature with great emphasis on legality and transparency. 
The resultant system is a crucial element of democratic consolidation both in terms of motivation 
and roles. In light of this background, however, there is real concern as to the effectiveness of the 
system due to the way it is structured and staffed. The concern with effectiveness is new, and is 
due to rampant violence by organized crime in the biggest cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 
and the upcoming Pan American Games to be held in Rio de Janeiro in July of 2007. 
The Intelligence Services 
Key Intelligence and Security Services  
According to Decree Law No 4,376 of September 13, 2002, implementing Law No. 9,883 of 
December 7, 1999, which created the Brazilian Intelligence System (Sistema Brasileiro de 
Inteligencia,SISBIN), the SISBIN is composed of thirteen organizations spread over ten different 
ministries and three separate elements of the Presidency. Of these thirteen the most important 
are the following: Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agencia Brasileira de Inteligencia, ABIN), which 
is the central organ of SISBIN; the Coordinating Office for Intelligence of the Federal Police 
(Coordenacao de Inteligencia do Departamento de Policia Federal, PF) of the Ministry of Justice; 
the Department for Strategic Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense (Departamento de Inteligencia 
Estrategica of the Ministerio da Defesa, MOD) as well as the intelligence sectors of the three 
services and the General Staff of the Armed Forces; and, the Secretariat for Institutional Security 
(Gabinete de Seguranca Institucional, GSI) of the Presidency, which, according to the decree law 
is the “coordinating organ for federal intelligence activities.” Today, following some seven years of 
development, the Brazilian intelligence system appears comprehensive and robust, with an 
extensive legal basis and multiple structures. The legal basis of the intelligence system has been 
thoroughly described by Marco Cepik, and it can be found in the Appendix to this paper. To 
understand the contemporary challenges confronting the Brazilian intelligence system, and to be 
able to begin to analyze its effectiveness, requires that we look to the legacy of the past. 
Background  
Legacy of the Past  
In 1964 the democratically elected government was overthrown in a military coup, and between 
then and 1985 the country was governed by a series of military presidents. While the level of 
repression was less than other Southern Cone dictatorships, it was still very serious, especially 
between 1968 and 1974, and the intelligence and security services were central to this repression. 
In my earlier work on the Church and Politics in Brazil I gave much attention to the role of the 
Doctrine of National Security in legitimating, at least in their own minds, the role of the armed 
forces in extirpating the Communist and other subversive forces from the society. Central to this 
crusade was the National Information Service (Servico Nacional de Informacoes, SNI). As Alfred 
Stepan demonstrates, the SNI, created by military decree less than three months after the coup, 
was granted expansive functions and prerogatives, which further expanded as the dictatorship 
took on new offensives against subversives, real and imagined. The SNI was the military regime’s 
main tool for control and repression. As Stepan states: “General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the 
chief author of the decree and the first direction of the SNI, later lamented that he had created a 
‘monster’. It is obvious, however, that regardless of its later expansion, the SNI was, from its 
inception, a powerful body.”[1]  
Stepan, and others, have demonstrated that the SNI became militarized, indeed the fourth 
military service. Stepan also demonstrates how the SNI expanded its functions, in the context of 
an increasingly repressive dictatorship, thus without civilian oversight, and came to monopolize 
more functions than any other major intelligence system in the world. Two of the military 
presidents in this period—General Garrastazu Medici and General Joao Figueiredo—had been 
heads of the SNI. If the SNI was not enough, the bureaucratic politics of the Brazilian dictatorship 
spawned several other intelligence organizations, resulting in an intelligence system that 
constituted a state within a state.[2] This system, with its high degree of autonomy and extensive 
power, opposed the slow transition from dictatorship to democracy, under military supervision, 
between 1974 and 1985. In sum, in the terms used in the study of state security, it was a “political 
police,” becoming an “independent security state” for the period of 1968-74.[3] The legacy of this 
very strong, autonomous, and repressive intelligence apparatus is fundamental to an 
understanding of the reforms after the transition in 1985.  
Also necessary for an understanding of the current system is awareness that the transition to 
democracy was initiated, and supervised, by the military regime itself. Beginning with President 
Ernesto Geisel in 1974, it was not completed (in terms of a civilian taking office as president) until 
1985. The military successfully slowed the pace of change and reform, and retained extensive 
prerogatives. Even after 1985, due to bad luck, the civilian that ultimately became president, Jose 
Sarney, 1985-90, was a holdover from the military regime itself. Due to him and the very 
complicated political environment in the late 1980s, the Constitution of 1988, the constitution of 
the “New Republic,” is very long, inconsistent, and to some degree was initially unworkable. Yet, 
it does provide a legal basis for a democratic Brazil, one in which there is a huge emphasis on 
legality or at least legalism. It must be emphasized, however, that the Constitution does not deal 
explicitly with intelligence.  
Due to even more bad luck, at least for Brazil, there was no president with democratic legitimacy 
until the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994. The significance of the lag in 
democratically elected civilians assuming power is that fundamental reforms in the security area 
and defense arenas, including intelligence were put off. It was not until 1999 that the first ever 
ministry of defense was created, and a civilian named as the minister. (Even then little progress 
was made due to allegations of crime and corruption of the first incumbent, who resigned in a few 
months.) And, it was not until 1999 that ABIN was created. The overall significance of the political 
transition and the first decade of the civilian governments, is that in the security and defense 
areas the governments, at least until President Cardoso took office, did not have the coherence 
(which is difficult to achieve in the political party and federal system emerging from the 1988 
Constitution) and legitimacy (based on free and fair election) to begin to establish a definitive 
structure in such areas as the armed forces and intelligence. In sum, it was 14 years after the 
supposed transition to civilian government that the basic structures pertaining to an intelligence 
system began to be established, and laws and decrees continued until very recently to be issued 
to implement different elements of the emerging system.  
If, during the military regime of 1964-85, the government saw real or imagined enemies 
everywhere, and used the SNI and other security services to identify and repress them, until very 
recently the perception of the democratic government was totally different. This is vividly captured 
in an interview with Minister of Defense Jose Viegas Filho in March of 2002. In response to a 
question, “Is Brazil Immune to Terrorism?” he stated: “No one can say that they are immune to 
terrorism. But if you were to draw up a list of countries that are vulnerable to this problem, Brazil 
would certainly be in one of the lowest rankings. Brazil has no enemies. There is not one country 
in the world that hates us or is prejudiced against us.”[4]  
The Pollyanna self-image of Brazil, without internal or external enemies and oriented towards 
domestic problems largely associated with socio-economic underdevelopment, has been the key 
theme of all governments since the transition to democracy in 1985. This perception is nicely 
expressed in a magisterial article by Celso Lafer, professor of Law at the University of Sao Paulo, 
and Foreign Minister during part of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments. After an 
historical review of Brazil’s internal development and international relations, Lafer states that “in 
the development of national space and the alleviation of poverty, the real challenge for Brazil lies 
in the negotiations of the financial agenda and the agenda for international trade.”[5] At no point 
in the article does Lafer discuss security or defense issues. His chapter is all about the 
development of “national space,” economic development, and national identity. According to Lafer, 
the foreign policy of Brazil is characterized by “…a concentration on the value of diplomacy and 
law in international intercourse as appropriate ways to deal with conflict, foster cooperation, and 
reduce the impetus of power politics.”[6] It should be noted that in this special number of 
Daedalus devoted to Brazil, there are fourteen chapters and not a single section of any one of 
them is even remotely related to contemporary security and defense issues or the armed forces.  
Another point of reference to demonstrate the lack of emphasis on national security and defense, 
one need only review the table of contents of the official summary of the accomplishments of the 
Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In Brazil 1994-2002: The Era of the Real[7] the topic 
of Defense, with 6 pages, is just above Tourism, with 4 pages. The Environment receives 14 
pages, Foreign Policy 21, and Development and Foreign Trade, 30. If anything, the government 
of President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, 2003-present, pays even less attention to national 
security and defense. Indeed, since he took office the Ministry of Defense, created in 1999, has 
languished.  
In sum, the Brazilian governments since the end of the military regime in 1985, hold a very benign 
view of the world in which national goals are to be achieved through diplomacy and trade. There 
is a huge stigma attached to the SNI, and thus to intelligence in general since the SNI was the 
core organization doing what was considered “intelligence” at that time. And, there is an equally 
great emphasis on law and legalism which members of the Congress, and particularly from 
political parties on the Left, have utilized in developing the legal basis for the current intelligence 
system. 
Intelligence Reforms 
The Reforms  
Undoubtedly the most critical and basic reform in the Brazilian intelligence system was the 
dissolution of the SNI in 1990 by President Collor de Mello. Unfortunately even if Fernando Collor 
de Melo had not been impeached in 1992, it is doubtful that he would have been able to 
implement a new system to replace the one left over from the military regime. At that time the SNI 
as still involved in dirty tricks, the Congress was just beginning to assert its power, and the 
Executive lacked a plan for intelligence reform. In any case despite some sporadic attention by 
the executive and legislative branches, it was not until December 7, 1999 that the law No. 9,883 
was passed by Congress creating ABIN. And, it was not until September 13, 2002 that decree No. 
4,376 implemented SESBIN. The story of the random efforts to reform intelligence between 1990 
and late 1999, is complex and illustrative of the situation of political disarray and lack of attention 
to security and defense in Brazil at that time, but is not central to my focus in this paper.[8]  
As noted above, there is a very strong emphasis in democratic Brazil on legality, and the 
legislature has played a central role in the creation of the current Brazilian intelligence system. 
The series of initiatives by Congress is due to several reasons. First, the executive, at least until 
after 1995, did not want to deal with security and defense. They were more than preoccupied with 
the economy and foreign debt. Second, there was a group of Leftist members of Congress who 
felt very strongly about the need to consolidate Brazilian democracy, probably most particularly in 
intelligence given the uses to which the system was put during the dictatorship. And third, the 
Congress has become very much aware of its exclusive powers in providing oversight over the 
Executive (“fiscalizacao”.) It should be no surprise, then, that there are several legal documents 
on which the System is based. These laws extend beyond ABIN to different components of the 
emerging system. In addition to law # 9,883 creating ABIN, and decree No. 4,376 decreeing into 
existence SISBIN, structuring the overall System, there are also the following laws (it should be 
noted that there are several different categories of laws in Brazil but to review them would take far 
too long.): Decree Law No. 3,448 of 5 May 2000 creating a Subsystem of Public Security 
Intelligence; Decree law No. 3,505 of 13 July 2000 instituting a Information Security Policy in the 
Federal Administration; Decree Law No. 3,695 of 21 December 2000 with further elaboration on 
Public Security Intelligence; and a policy directive from the Minister instituting the Defense 
Intelligence System in the Ministry of Defense. (See the Appendix for a complete listing.)  
In addition to establishing the overall and detailed legal framework for the system, the Congress 
attempted to deal with the issue of oversight. In my interviews in Brasilia in 1999 and 2000, the 
issue of oversight was being discussed, but there was little progress in establishing the 
mechanisms. In November of 2002, in an international conference on “Intelligence in Brazil: 
Contributions for Sovereignty and Democracy” oversight was a very prominent issue. On 
November 21, 2000 the Congress created the Joint Commission for External Control of 
Intelligence Activities (CCAI). By November 2005, and then again in December of 2006, (when I 
again did interviews in Brasilia), the legal basis for the Joint Committee had still not been 
established. While the committee was still in the process of formulation, its first chairman was 
Deputy Aldo Rebelo, who later became the Government Leader of the lower House. There is 
some question as to how effective this oversight committee can be since still in December, 2006, 
it had only one member of staff and the legal regulation for the workings of the committee had still 
not been passed. It should be noted that the Senate approves the nomination of the Director of 
ABIN.  
With regard to oversight within the Executive, there is both a Secretariat for Internal Control in the 
Presidency (Secretaria de Controle Interno da Presidencia da Republica) which oversees the 
budget in general of the Presidency, and the Court for National Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da 
Uniao, TCU) which also specifically looks to ABIN. In terms of the framework proposed in our 
book, then, we can say that the levels of democratic civilian control are as follows:[9] Executive—
High; Legislative—Low; Judicial—Medium; Internal—Medium; External—Medium. 
A Hybrid System 
In light of the above, it should be no surprise that the intelligence system is a hybrid. In interviews 
and in published materials the data indicate that the models on which the system is based is a 
combination of the United States and Canadian systems, with emphasis on the latter. Like the 
United States, Brazil has, at least formally, a very comprehensive system composed of thirteen 
different organizations. Of particular relevance here, in addition to ABIN, are the Federal Police 
and the intelligence services of the three armed forces. The coordination of the system, therefore, 
is supposed to take place in the GSI. Given his role in creating the System and managing it for 
four years, the Minister-Chief, General Alberto Cardoso was able to fuse intelligence from both 
civilian and military organizations. The Canadian model is logical considering the Brazilians are 
trying to distance themselves from the SNI, their benign view of the world, and the crucial role 
played by Leftist deputies in the basic laws. Consequently, there is more emphasis on 
transparency than on effectiveness. Based on interviews in December of 2005 and 2006, under 
the continuing Minister-Chief, General Armando Felix, the GSI continued to be the main location 
for fusing intelligence. 
A Public Relations Campaign to Promote the Legitimacy of Intelligence in a Democracy 
The emphasis throughout, from the mid 1990s until the present, has been on distancing the 
emerging intelligence system from the stigma of the SNI and other militarized intelligence 
organizations during the dictatorship. Since Brazil faces no obvious external threats, the 
Executive, even if it wanted to, was unable to make an argument to preserve the old system. It 
should also be repeated that the democratic transition was the initiative of the military, over the 
opposition of the sector of the military in the SNI and other intelligence organizations. In addition, 
while the focus all along has been on replacing the SNI, and ABIN is that replacement, there has 
always been the Federal Police and the intelligence services of the armed forces. Consequently, 
the reforms have been met with passivity on the part of intelligence officers and other in the 
Executive, and by total apathy by the general public. It is for this reason that Deputy Aldo Rebelo 
held the very high profile conference in Brasilia on 6-7 November 2002 with the subtitle of 
“Contributions for Sovereignty and Democracy” with a tremendous amount of publicity. In late 
November of 2005 and early December of 2006, the ABIN itself hosted international seminars 
with some 500 people in attendance and ample media coverage. The goal in all cases has been 
to publicize the importance of intelligence in a democracy. 
Challenges in Democratic Consolidation and Effectiveness  
Democratic Control, Yes; but Concern with Effectiveness 
In terms of democratic consolidation, the reforms of the intelligence system are highly successful. 
The system is composed of several different, and competing, intelligence organizations, there is a 
robust legal framework within which it must operate, there is an emerging structure of executive 
and some congressional oversight, and it is largely transparent. In terms of effectiveness, 
however, there is real concern.[10] In the relatively recent past there was evidence less of the 
abuse of power of the intelligence system then its inability to predict such key events as a 
truckers strike or the strikes by police in many cities in the late 1990s. And, the intelligence 
systems did not appear to be effective in the waves of violence promoted by organized crime in 
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo throughout 2006 and early 2007.  
Implications for Effectiveness Arising from the Manner of Democratic Consolidation  
The reform of the intelligence system was a key element, along with the creation of the MOD, in 
Brazil's democratic consolidation. The elimination of the SNI and other intelligence organizations 
of the military dictatorship were extremely important elements in the consolidation process. The 
creation of the SISBIN, and the legal framework within which it is situated, is also very important 
for consolidation. The oversight mechanism is currently in a very slow process of construction. 
The main challenges in consolidation currently, as with the MOD, are to finish the 
institutionalization of the institutions and to interest and educate sufficient civilians who will be 
able to assume control in both intelligence and in national security and defense. Currently there 
are only a handful of members of Congress who are interested and engaged. The same applies 
to potential staff for the Executive, including ABIN and the MOD. The same also applies to civil 
society to include the media, think tanks, and NGOs. Since 2002, and the coming into power of 
the first Presidency of Lula, there has been a serious loss of momentum in the MOD. Despite 
serious efforts between 2000 and 2002 to develop the institution and expertise of the staff, there 
has been only regression during the past four years. The situation has not been so serious with 
ABIN and SISBIN in general, but there are continuing impediments to increased effectiveness, 
largely due to the legacy of the past and the process of democratic consolidation. 
Limitations on effectiveness in intelligence 
There are at least four limitations or impediments to effectiveness due to the legacy of the past 
and the process of democratic consolidation. First, ABIN is not allowed to intercept 
communications or open mail. While the Federal Police area allowed to intercept communications, 
provided a judge grants the request, this information may or may not be passed on to ABIN.[11] 
While this is not specifically stated, the overall emphasis in ABIN is on open source information 
rather than traditional “spying”. This leads to the second impediment that is entry into ABIN via a 
public competition rather than selective recruitment. Involved in this point is the fact that 
employees of ABIN are regulated by the same public service rules as all other public servants. 
Thirdly, and following from the previous point, once into the public service, employees of ABIN 
can sign up for other competitions and, if successful, move on to other, better paying and more 
prestigious positions. This does little for stability of the institution and the competence of its 
analytical capability. Fourth, there is no provision in law to punish a person who releases or leaks 
classified information. Only the standard criminal laws apply which relate to theft. As there are no 
specific laws regarding classified information, and as a normal court process would be 
unacceptable in the context of releasing secret information, there seems to be in fact no penalty 
in releasing classified information. There are, in short, very serious impediments to effective 
intelligence in Brazil as ABIN is supposed to be the center of the overall system. 
Perception of Threats   
“Acceptable Threats”  
Unfortunately for Brazil, despite the popular belief that Brazil indeed has no enemies, which is 
shared by the overwhelming majority of politicians, there are in fact challenges or threats which 
might just require an effective intelligence system. Government officials such as Congressman 
Aldo Rebelo, as head of the Joint Oversight Committee, have emphasized all along the threats 
arising from globalization concerning science, technology, and natural resources, especially in the 
Amazon. ABIN also utilizes this justification for increasing effectiveness.[12] What is new, 
however, is an increasing concern by some in the GSI and ABIN, regarding international terrorism. 
Until very recently, all official spokesmen, including the previous Minister/Chief of the GSI, 
General Alberto Cardoso, stated that there was no terrorist threat to Brazil.[13] The title of the 
international seminar in November 2005, sponsored by ABIN, was “International Seminar on 
Intelligence and Contemporary Challenges” and there was no specific attention to the possible 
threat of international terrorism. 
A New Perception of Terrorism as a Threat? 
The title of the seminar in early December 2006 was “Second International Seminar on State 
Intelligence, the Media, and Terrorism”. What has changed, for the first time to focus on terrorism, 
can best be explained by three points. First, there is awareness that international terrorists may 
attack a foreign target, such as the U.S. or Israeli embassy, in another country as was the case in 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Argentina. Second, based on the experience in Madrid on March 11, 2004, 
where criminal elements morphed into terrorists and linked up with Al Qaeda, there is concern 
that the same could happen in Brazil. Third, and the main event focusing their attention, is the 
imminent hosting by Brazil of the Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro in July of 2007. Such a 
global and public event is perceived to present an unparalleled opportunity for international 
terrorists to show their global reach. Everyone is keenly aware that the crime situation in Rio de 
Janeiro is precarious, and even with “rounding up the usual suspects,” if this were even possible 
given corruption, may not be enough to provide the protection necessary if international terrorists 
decided to attack. There is much riding on the success of the games, for hosting them 
successfully would put Brazil into competition for hosting other events such as the Soccer World 
Cup and the Olympics.  
Conclusions  
Brazil has developed an intelligence system that appears to be comprehensive and robust. There 
are, however, some concerns about how effective it is in that the central organizing agency, ABIN, 
is itself weak and very much in a state of flux. During the past year there has been an increasing 
awareness of the need for a more effective intelligence system. There is now a great deal of 
attention to prepare for the Pan American Games in Rio de Janeiro in July of 2007, and to 
minimize the chance of a terrorist attack. There is, consequently, much consideration being 
directed to how to strengthen, to make more effective, the intelligence system. 
Sources of Information  
Comments on sources of information are relevant in the area of intelligence studies for two main 
reasons: 
1. First, there is really no academic discipline of intelligence studies, and the analytical 
publications are just now beginning to emerge.  
2. Second, intelligence is normally secret, and the aphorism of “those who know don’t say 
and those who say don’t know” applies.  
To have insights into a country’s intelligence system, therefore, requires some kind of special 
effort and privileged access. In the case of Brazil I can claim to have both. 
For a bibliography on the general topic of intelligence and politics see: Greta E. Marlatt, 
Intelligence and Policy-Making: A Bibliography (Monterey: Dudley Knox Library, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005), 79 pages. Available at: 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/May/intellall2007.pdf 
There are a few published sources on the Brazilian intelligence system. For the background on 
the SNI, ending with the middle of the Sarney administration, 1985-90, see Alfred Stepan’s 
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988). It is very useful as chapter two is an analysis of the role of the SNI in the military regime 
and its resistance to the democratic transition. Scott Tollefson’s chapter five, “National Security” 
in Rex Hudson, ed., Brazil: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1998), 337-
411, includes information on intelligence on pages 358-62. Luis Bittencourt has analyzed the role 
of the Congress in the earliest phase of intelligence reforms in his O poder legislativo e os 
services secretos no Brasil (1964-1990) (Brasilia: Faculdades Integradas da Catolica da Brasilia, 
1998). Priscilla Carlos Brandao Antunes in SNI &ABIN: Uma Leitura da Atuacao dos Servicos 
Secretos Brasileiros ao Longo do Seculo XX (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2002) has done a 
good job in describing and analyzing the evolution of the Brazilian intelligence from 1990 right up 
to and including the creation of ABIN in 1999. She and Marco Cepik have written an excellent 
survey article of Brazilian intelligence published in the International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, XVI, No. 3 (July-September, 2003). “The New Brazilian Intelligence Law: An 
Institutional Assessment.” Marco Cepik’s Ph.D. dissertation is “Servicos de Inteligencia: Agilidade 
e Transparencia como Dilemas de Institucionalizacao” (doctoral dissertation at IUPERJ, Rio de 
Janeiro, 2001). Marco Cepik wrote a chapter for our book, “Structural Change and Democratic 
Control of Intelligence in Brazil,” in Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz, eds., Reforming 
Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2007). ABIN publishes a Relatorio Annual and began Revista Brasileira de Inteligencia in 
December 2005.  
In addition to these published sources I have relied on my own experiences and interviews in 
Brazil. Beginning in 1967, my research in Brazil was on the Catholic Church as a political 
institution. In the field research on this topic, with periodic visit to Brazil from the late 1960s 
through the mid-1980s, I had contact with a great many Catholic and Protestant activists—priests, 
nuns, ministers, and lay people—who, due to their involvement in social and political change 
movement, had or would suffer at the hands of the military regime’s intelligence system. During 
the mid-to-late 1980s I focused my research on the efforts to consolidate Brazilian democracy 
through the drafting of a new constitution. During that research I became aware of the emphasis 
in the new regime on ensuring democracy through passing laws, on legalism. This emphasis is 
clear in the area of intelligence reforms.  
In 1999 and 2000, while trying to interest Brazilian officials in CCMR programs, I made two trips 
to Brazil during which time I met with officials dealing with intelligence reform. In early August 
1999 I met with Joao Ricardo C. de Souza who was the main congressional staffer drafting the 
legislation for the ABIN. At that time I also met with Senator Romeu Tuma who was the relator of 
the law creating ABIN.  
In late June 2000 I met again with the Joao Ricardo C. de Souza who was by then working on the 
SISBIN law. In November of 2001, CCMR delivered a one-week seminar in Brasilia on civil-
military relations under the sponsorship of the MOD. One of the topics covered in the seminar 
was Democratic Control of Intelligence. We also ran a simulation on this topic. From the inputs by 
the Brazilian participants to the seminar, and the results of the simulation, I gained some new 
insights into the state of intelligence reform. Probably most important in the development of this 
paper was my participation in a watershed conference in Brasilia on November 6-7, 2002 on the 
topic of “Intelligence Activities in Brazil: Contributions for Sovereignty and Democracy” sponsored 
by the Brazilian Congress and held in the facilities of the House. It was specifically sponsored by 
the Joint Commission for the Control of Intelligence Activities (CCAI) under the chairmanship of 
Deputy Aldo Rebelo. This conference had presentations by the heads of all of the relevant 
intelligence organizations. It was attended by more than 300 officials and officers at any one time, 
was televised, and otherwise widely covered in the media. There was also a good deal of debate 
which allowed for clarification of a number of issues. At that time, and again in late November 
when CCMR held another seminar for the MOD, I met with friends working for General Alberto 
Cardoso in the Secretariat for Institutional Security. Later, during my participation in two ABIN-
sponsored international seminars in November 2005 and December 2006, I learned a great deal 
from the presentations. I also made interviews with staff at both the GSI and ABIN during these 
visits. 
The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views 
of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
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Appendix of Laws and Decrees[14]  
Brazilian federal intelligence and related laws[*] 
Type of law  Number  Enact 
Year  
Main Focus  Comment  
   
Constitution  
   
Art. 5  
   
1988  
Freedom of expression 
and right to information  
State security related exceptions  
Constitution  Art. 142  1988  Armed Forces roles and 
missions  
External defense, uphold the 
Constitution and, under request of 
the constitutional government to 
law and order in the internal realm  
Ordinary Law  7.170  1983  National Security Law  Still in place / passed under military 
rule. Congress examines now a Bill 
(PL 6.764/2002) dealing with 
crimes against the state and 
democracy  
Ordinary Law  8.028  1990  Terminate the National 
Information Service 
(SNI)  
SNI was the powerful intelligence 
and security service of the Brazilian 
military regime  
   
   
   
Ordinary Law  8.159  1991  Archives National Policy Main regulation regarding access 
to government files  
   
Executive Decree  
   
4.553  2002  Information security  Security classifications and 
clearances  
Ordinary Law  9.034  1995  Use of operational 
means (i.e. technical 
surveillance) to prevent 
and repress crime  
Some articles changed by Law 
10.217/2001  
Ordinary Law  9.296  1996  Judicial authorization in 
advance for telephone 
intercepts  
ABIN is not allowed to either ask 
for such an authorization or to 
engage in tapping operations  
Ordinary Law  9.883  1999  To establish the 
Brazilian Intelligence 
Agency (ABIN) and the 
Brazilian Intelligence 
System (SISBIN)  
Missions are defined in fairly 
general terms based upon a broad 




97  1999  To establish the 
Defense Ministry (MD) 
and the General 
Defense Staff (EMD)  
MD structure and resources were 
detailed by Decree 4.735/2003 and 
Policy Directive MD 1.037/2003  
Executive Decree  3.695  2000  To establish the Public 
Security Intelligence 
SENASP / MJ as coordinator; 
Decree 3.348/2002 first defined 
   Sub-System  
(SISP)  
ABIN as SISP central agency, but 
the Ministry of the Justice was able 
to regain the coordinator role for 
the SISP  
   
   
   
Executive Decree  4.376  2002  To specify SISBIN’s 
organization and 
membership  
Define members of the SISBIN and 
its Consulting Council; 
complemented by decree 
4.872/2003  
Policy Directive  
Ministry of 
Defense  




Strategic Intelligence Department 
(DIE) of the MoD as the central 
organ  
Ordinary Law  10.862  2004  ABIN’s Special Career 
Plan  
Defines the Information Analyst 
career, from entry until retirement, 
through training, progression and 




08  2000  Joint Commission for 
the Intelligence 
Activities Control  
(CCAI)  
CCAI was established in 2000; until 
today the Brazilian Congress has 
not approved the Commission’s 
internal rules  
* Legal and administrative examples of instruments utilized by the Brazilian Congress to regulate 
different aspects of the intelligence and security field. As one should expect, Constitutional 
articles are hard to change (requiring a majority of 3/5 in both houses of the Congress). 
Complementary Laws are supposed to further regulate and make more specific some 
Constitutional articles. This type of law in Brazil requires an absolute majority in both houses of 
the National Congress. Inside the Brazilian legal hierarchy, Ordinary Laws are just laws, they are 
situated below the Constitution and the Complementary Laws, and they require just a simple 
majority (half plus one of the Representatives attending the Congress session) to be passed and 
enacted. Executive decrees are situated even below in legal terms, they are not laws, but they set 
policies and rules to the government agencies, much like the Executive Orders in United States. 
Policy Directives are administrative measures issued by specific Ministers and Cabinet members 
to regulate the government agencies under their responsibility. Finally, there are Legislative 
decrees and Congress internal resolutions dealing with specific problems of internal organization 
and policy. See www.interlegis.gov.br. 
